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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
DON PUGH,

Plaintiff-Respondent)

vs.

CUMON STRATTON and RUBY
ANDERSON

(
\

Case No. 11102

\

Defendants-Appellants)

..................................................................................

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
..................................................................................
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a replevin action brought by the PlaintiffHcspondcnt as a livestock grower for the recovery of
cattle sold to a livestock dealer who in turn sold the
cattle to the Defendants~Appellants who purchased the
cattle in good faith from the dealer at a livestock auction so.le in the ordinary course of business.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court found the issue for the Plaintiff... ~'~;pondcnt after submission of the case on the pleadings,
a deposition and a stipulation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Defendants-Appellants seek a reversal of the
lower Court's judgment and for this court to direct the
10Y1cr court to enter a judgment of No Cause of Action
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and also that the case be remanded for any further proceedings before a court of the proper venue.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There was no trial of the case below but rather the
plaintiff filed a motion for a summary judgment after
the pleadings were filed and a deposition of the plaintiff taken and at thP argument on the motion for summary judgment, the parties determined to submit the
matter on the merits, based on the various pleadings, a
short stipulation and the deposition. There was no substantial disagreement as to the facts alleged in the
ple:iclings and affidavits.
This action is in replevin and the plaintiff seeks to
recover ten head of cattle from the defendant-appellant
Stratton and eight head of cattle from the defendant-appellant Anderson. \Vrits of Replevin were served in each
instance but each defendant supplied a re-delivery bond
and kef)t possession of the cattle.
On November 1, 1966 the eighteen head of cattle,
alons with two other head \vhich are not the subject of
this action, were sold by the plaintiff in Kane County,
Utah to the Tri-State Livestock Auction, a licensed livestock dealer of St. George, Utah. Possession of the cattle
was delivered to tlw dealer and the parties executed a
comuination Bill of Sale and Sight Draft at the time of
delivery. The Bill of Sale was executed to the dealer by
the plaintiff who in turn received the sight draft which
was later dishono1·ed by the Bank upon which it was
drawn, State Bank of Southern Utah at Cedar City, Utah.
Ho\\ ever, on :November 3, 1966 the Tri-State Livestock Auction, the dealer that had bought the cattle, sold
the cattle at R l'l'gular cattle auction at their auction
ring at St. Georg£', Utah to the defendants who bought
in good faith and without notice and paid in cash the
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full purchase price and each defendant took the cattle
purchased to their respective ranches in Iron and Washington Counties, Utah.
When the sight draft was dishonored, the plaintiff
instituted this action against the defendants to recover
his cattle. As is usually the case, the Tri-State Livestock
Auction, the dealer, has gone defunct. Therefore, we
have a situation where the plaintiff sold and delivered
his cattle to a cattle dealer who did not pay but who in
turn sold them to the defendants who bought in good
faith, with the true wrong-doer now defunct and not a
party to this action.
ARGUMENT

Point No. 1
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS TRANSFERRED BY
EXECUTION OF A BILL OF SALE AND DELIVERY
OF THE CATTLE AND THEIR SALE THROUGH
A REGULAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION.
At the time of the sale and delivery of the cattle
by the plaintiff to Tri-State Livestock Auction, the parties executed a combination Bill of Sale and Sight Draft.
The Bill of Sale is in the usual simple language of a Bill
of Sale and it and the draft are as follows:
-

'

TRI-STATE LIVESTOCK AUCTION ____ .... No. 65
Livestock Dealer
Cedar City, Utah, Nov. 1, 1966
At Sight, pay to order of Don Pugh ______________ $1,648.86
Sixteen Hundred forty-eight and 86/100 ______ Dollars
to: Tri-State Livestock Auction
Thru: State Bank of Southern Utah
Present for Collection
By Harold Woodard
Drawer
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No.

Kind or class

Wgt.

Price

Totals

10 WF Steer Calves
3298
$27.00
$890.46
10 WF Heifer Calves
3160
$24.00
$758.40
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: That I
the seller hereunder, residing at _____________________________________ _
State of Utah, in consideration of the payment of the
above draft have bargained and sold and by these
presents do bargain and sell unto the drawer and to
State Bank of Southern Utah, Cedar City, Utah the
above described livestock and hereby hold myself
to warrant and defend the title of said livestock
against any person claiming the same or any part
of them.
DON PUGH
It should be noted that the Bill of Sale is in the usual simple language of a bill of sale used to transfer title with the delivery of the property sold and was by its
terms a present bargain and sell transfer. True it does
provide that "in consideration of the payment of the
above draft" but this is only the usual language of any
bill of sale and does not mean that the transfer of title
was conditioned upon the draft being paid. Plaintiff has
never claimed that he held a recorded security interest
or that this was a secured transaction as defined in our
Uniform Commercial Code. Instead he has claimed that
this was a "cash sale" and that he held a security interest until the draft was paid. But such "cash sales" have
for all practical purposes been done away with by the
Uniform Commercial Code as hereinafter set forth. Furthermore, it is clear that title passed with the delivery
of possession and execution of the Bill of Sale.

Section 70A-2-401 (2) Utah Code Ann. governs this
situation and provides as follows:
"Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to
the buyer at the time and place at which the seller
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completes his performance with reference to the
physical delivery of goods, despite any reservation
of a security interest and even though a document
of title is to be delivered at a different time or place;
and in particular and despite any reservation of a
security interest by the bill of lading."
Nothing remained to be done by the seller and the
only thing left for the completion of the transaction was
payment of the draft but this would not prevent title
from passing because if that is all there is left to do and
an instrument of transfer has been executed and possession of the property delivered to the buyer, title passes.
After Tri-State Livestock Auction took possession,
the cattle were taken to the yards and auction ring of
the buyer at St. George, Utah and there were sold to the
defendants at a regular auction in the ordinary course
of business and the defendants were the bona fide purc!1asers.
Livestock auctions have become widespread throughout the \\est in the past several years. They provide a
clearing house, so to speak or an open market where
one can have his livestock sold and where a buyer can
find what he wants readily available. Some times the
sale is a true auction where the Auction sells for an owner on commission and some times, however, the Auction
itself has purchased the livestock and sells on its own
behalf as was the case here. In fact livestock auction
sales have come into such general use that our Legislature has enacted laws to govern such sales being Sec.
tions 4-13-38 to 42, Utah Code and amendments thereto.
Admittedly if livestock auctions sales were not regulated,
t~1ey could easily become the old Market Overt of the
common law in England where stolen property and prope1·ty obtained by other dishonest means was taken for
sale. Stringent regulations are set up to protect both the
O\\'ner of the livestock and also the buyer.
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Section 4-13-42 provides that the livestock when
entering a sales ring shall be inspected by the brand inspector and they must be released and cleared for sale
by him and therefore, he has to be assured as .to the
right of the auction or owner to sell. This section provides as follows:
"All livestock upon entering a livestock sales ring
or a livestock auction sales ring shall be inspected
for brands and marks by an authorized inspector of
the state board of agriculture, and it is unlawful
for any livestock sales ring or livestock auction sales
ring to offer for sale any cattle or horses until the
same have been brand inspected and released by an
authorized brand inspector.
"The operator of each livestock sales ring and livestock auction sales ring in this state shall furnish
title to the livestock to the purchaser of all livestock sold through his or its sales ring. And it shall
be the duty of such operator, when notified by the
authorized brand inspector that there is a question
as to whether any designated livestock sold through
said ring is lawtully owned by the consignor thereof,
to hold the proceeds received from the sale of said
livestock for a reasonable time not to exceed 60
days to permit the consignor to establish ownership
and if at the expiration of that time the consignor
fails to establish his lawful ownership of such livestock to the satisfaction of said brand inspector,
said prnceeds shall be transmitted by such operator
to the departme11t of agriculture, and the department of agriculture receipt shall relieve said operator from furthl'r :cesponsibility from said proceeds.
Said proceeds shall be handled according to section 4-13-33."
Therefore, when a buyer buys livestock at the sale,
he is guaranteed title and since he must pay cash, he
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has the right to expect title. He also has the right to
expect that the brands and ownership to have been
cleared for the sale. In this particular case, the brand
inspector has supplied an affidavit of the brands and to
whom the cattle were sold. We must assume further
that he has also released the cattle for sale and he must
have been satisfied as to the title to the cattle. When
the defendants paid the purchase price and took away
the cattle, as bona fide purchasers, they obtained title.
These cattle, by being run through a licensed auction in
the 01·dinary course of business became the property of
tl:e purchasers.
The Bill of Sale signed by the plaintiff was to Tristate Livestock Auction and to the State Bank of Southern Utah, the bank upon which the draft was drawn.
This bank had possession of the draft and bill of sale,
either in its own right or as agent for Tri-State Livestock
Auction and the brand inspector must have been supplied with evidence of title or he would not have cleared
the livestock for sale.
Respondent and also the Court below has placed
almost entire reliance upon Section 4-13-17, Utah Code
Ann. which provides that a Bill of Sale of livestock must
be made out and accompany the livestock and that when
the livestock bear the registered brand of some one other
Cian the seller, any purchaser is put on notice to inquire
as to the ownership. It is submitted this was done and
the brand inspector, before releasing and clearing the
cattle for sale at the auction, would have to satisfy hims0lf that everything as to title and ownership was in
order. The defendants as the buyers at the Auction
would ha vc no further duty to inquire because the law
as to auction sales provides that the brands are inspected and the cattle must be released for sale before the
auction sale takes place and the Auction must guarantee
title. It is common knowledge that at such auction sales,

the buyer does not bother to ascertain if the operator or
selier has authority to sell or title because the law puts
the duty upon the brand inspector and provides that
the purchaser gets title.

Point 2
THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS AS PURCHASERS FROM THE CATTLE DEALER AT AN AUCTION IN GOOD FAITH OBTAINED TITLE AS
AGAINST THE FORMER OWNER WHO HAD DELIVERED POSSESSION TO THE DEALER.
As pointed out above, it is the contention of the
defendants that Tri-State Livestock Auction held the title to the cattle and that the defendants obtained the
title from the Auction at the sale. However, if for any
reason title did not pass to Tri-State, title still was obtained by the defendants. When the plaintiff turned
possession of the cattle to Tri-State Livestock Auction
he knew or should have known he was selling to an auction as a livestock dealer. On the Combination Bill of
Sale and Sight Draft, was the name "Tri-State Livestock
Auction, Livestock Dealer", as the buyer and drawer of
the draft. The plaintiff testified he knew of the auction
at St. George, Utah and he snould have known that the
cattle would be resold by the Auction and that the persons buying would expect title.
Let us assume for the purpose of argument that
the Bill of Sale did not transfer title to Tri-State but
the title was to pass only upon and conditioned upon
the payment of the draft. In other words that a "cash
sale" was intended. However, title would still pass to
the buyers at thP auction sale for the reason set forth
below.
For many years the rule of the law has been that
in the sale of personal property, a seller cannot give any
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better title than he has and if he has no title, his buyer
gets none. In a great majority of cases this rule is just
aad fair and with it the appellants have no quarrel. However, it was found many years ago that there were some
situations in which it could not be applied and certain
exceptions become grafted on to the general rule. In fact
the Uniform Sales Act adopted by most states around
the turn of the century and by Utah in 1917 contained a
provision, which was Section 60-2-7, Utah Code Ann.
1953, which, after stating the above general rule as to
title, provided as follows:
"Unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct
precluded from denying the seller's authority to
sell."
A great body of law was developed which followed
the above exception as did the State of Utah in the case
of Heaston vs. Martinez, 282 Pac.2d. 833. There a wholesale automobile dealer in Denver, Colorado sold two automobiles to a used car dealer at Murray, Utah. The
used car dealer brought the cars to his lot under an
arrangement whereby the endorsed title certificates
were sent to the First National Bank of Murray, Utah
with sight drafts attached and the dealer promised not
to sell the cars until he had picked up the title certificates and paid the sight drafts. He did neither but sold
the two cars to good faith purchasers and the wholesaler in Denver attempted to replevin the two cars from
the good faith purchasers. This court held that the Denver wholesaler, by delivering possession to the used car
dealer, knowing he would put them on his lot for sale,
was precluded and estoppecl from claiming the cars and
that the good faith purchasers had title.
The Heaston case was decided in 1955 and for some
time before and until a few years after there were a great
number of cases holding to this rule, one of which is
Linton vs. Citizens State Bank, 368 Pac.2d 92 (Okla.). In
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fact so many cases followed this exception to the general rule in conferring title to a bona fide purchaser,
that the compilers of the Uniform Commercial Code
collected all these cases into one major rule rather than
in an exception to the general rule as had the compilers
of the Uniform Sales Act. It was found that in a number
of cases a seller should be able to pass title to personal
property even though he did not have title. Utah adopted
and enacted the Uniform Commercial Code in 1965 and
it took effect on January 1 1966 and this was also the
repeal of the Uniform Sales Act. The rule under discussion is now Section 70A-2-403 of our code. Therefore,
we have a situation where the law has gone through a
considerable evolution, made necessary by the needs
of business, to have a simple uniform rule governing
the transfer of title to a purchaser where the seller actually had no title. Section 70A-2-403 of our Uniform
Commercial Code is as follows:
(1)

A purchaser of goods acquires all title which his
transferor had or had power to transfer except
that a purchaser of a limited interest acquires rights
only to the extent of the interest purchased. A person with voidable title has power to transfer a good
title to a good faith purchaser for value. When the
goods have been delivered under a transaction of
purchase the purchaser has such power even though
(a) The transferror was deceived as to the identity
of the purchaser, or
( b) the delivery was in exchange for a check which
is la1er dishonored, or
( c)

It was agreed that the transaction was to be

a "cash sale" or

(d) Delivery was procured through fraud punishable as larcenous under the criminal law.
(2) Any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
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chant who deals in goods of that kind gives him
power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a
buyer in the ordinary course of business.
(3) "Entrusting" includes any delivery and any acquiescence in the retention of possession regardless of ·
any condition expressed between the parties to the
delivery or acquiesence and regardless of whether
the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor's
disposition of the goods have been such as to be
larcenous under the criminal law.
l4) The rights of other purchasers of goods and of lien
creditors are governed by the Articles on Secured
Transactions (Article 9) Bulk Transfers (Article 6)
and lJocuments of Title (Article 7).
It will be noted that the above rule collects in one
provision most of the classes of cases and the case law
which had grown up prior to adoption of the Uniform
Commercial Code and it is contended by the Appellants
that in at least three different sub-sections of this rule,
this case is covered. For instance the above section provides that when goods have been delivered under a transaction of purchase to a purchaser, the purchaser has
power to transfer title even though (b) the delivery
was in exchange for a check which is later dishonored
or ( c) it was agreed that the transaction was to be a
"cash sale" or (2) Any entrusting of possession of goods
to a merchant or dealer who deals in goods of this kind
gives the dealer power to transfer title to a buyer in the
ordinary course of business. In particular it is felt that
the above categories all apiJly to this case and particularly Sub-paragraph (2) where possession is entrusted
to a dealc1· or merchant.
It is submitted that the adoption of this new rule
was made necessary by a rapidly expanded sales of personal propc'rty where millions cf dollars worth of such
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property are sold each day by dealers and merchants to
persons who have a right to expect that the dealer has
authority to sell and pass title. Yet under the lower
court's ruling, the buyer from this dealer would have
the duty in each instance of ascertaining first if the dealer had title. The speed at which business is now done
and the millions of dollars worth of business transacted
each day have made it impossible for the purchaser
from the dealer to first inquire and satisfy himself before purchasing.
Since the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
a number of works have come into quite general usage
by the bench and bar, one of which is Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code. In this work there is a complete discussion of Section 70A-2-403 above quoted and
the history and reason for this rule is clearly set forth
and this authority makes it clear that this rule was intended to apply to the case before us and in fact fits
the situation exactly. See Anderson's Uniform Commercial Code, Volume 1 pages 279 et. seq.
The enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code in
Utah and particularly Section 70A-2-403 above quoted
has made statutory the holding of the Heaston vs. Martinez case, supra.
The respondent seems to contend and joined in by
the lower court that for some unexplained reason the
Uniform Commercial Code does not apply to livestock
sales and that the Brand and Anti-theft Act is the only
applicable statutes. But this Act, being Title 4, Chapter
13 of our Code is concerned primarily with the prevention of theft of liwstock and not with the situation here
presented, which is a bona fide sale transaction. The
Uniform Commercial Code is of general and wide application, intended to cover sales of all personal property
and there is no reason why it does not apply to livestock sales and specifically to livestock auction sales.
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Section 70A-2-403 relied upon here is entirely consistent
with Section 4-13-42 of the Brand and Anti-theft act because both are concerned with title passing in a sale
from a dealer to a good faith purchaser and they are in
no way inconsistent with each other. Even if Tri-State
Livestock Auction did not have title, then the entrusting of possession to it by the plaintiff made it possible
for the defendants to acquire title when they purchased
in good taith.

Point No. 3
THE PROPER VENUE FOR THIS ACTION WAS
WHERE THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE OR
WHERE THE DEFENDANTS RESIDE AND THE
MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE SHOULD
HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
In this action a motion for a change of venue was
filed by the defendants and denied by the court. The defendants earnestly contend that the lower court should
have granted the motion as the county in which the action was filed was not the proper county.
As shown by the pleadings and affidavits below,
the cattle were sold and delivered by the plaintiff to Tristate, a livestock dealer, in Kane County, Utah. Tristate then took the cattle to its yards and auction
ring at St. George in Washington County, Utah. At the
auction sale two days later, part of the cattle were sold
to the defendant Stratton and he took them to his ranch
and residence at Hurricane, Washington County, Utah
and the remaining cattle were sold to the defendant anderson ancl she took them to her ranch and residence at
Beryl in Iron County, Utah. When the action was filed
in Kane County, Utah the cattle were still in Iron and
Washington Counties and their owners resided there.
The Sheriff's return shows that he found part of the
cattle at :Ccryl, Irnn County in possession of the defend-
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ant Anderson and the remaining part of the cattle were
found at Hurricane, Washington County, Utah in possession of the defendant Stratton. It is highly possible that
there should have been separate actions below but this
point was not raised. However, the action should not
have been filed in Kane County but either in Iron or
Washington Counties.
The plaintiff has proceeded on the theory and followed by the Court below that the cattle were converted
by Tri-State Livestock Auction in Kane County, with a
tint of fraud or mis-representation and that the buyer
took possession in Kane County and therefore, this was
the proper county. This may have been true had the action been against Tri-State but it is not a defendant,
but instead two people who bought the cattle and took
possession in Washington County and then took them to
their respective ranches where they were when this action was commenced and where the two defendants reside. No action could have possibly have arisen as
against these two defendants until they took possession
of the cattle as replevin is a possessory remedy. One
would think from the pleadings and theory of the plaintiff that this action is against TriState but it is not and
instead it is two buyers from the Auction who are defendants.
As to where actions are filed in Utah is governed
by statute, being Title 78, Chapter 13 of the Utah Code.
There it is specifically provided where different kinds
of specific actions must be filed, none of which is replevin and then Section 70-13-7 provides that "in all other
cases, the action must be tried in the county in which
the cause of action arises or in the county in which the
defendant resides at the commencement of the action."
Since this section is applicable to this case, then it
should have been filed and tried where the defendants
reside or where the cause of action arose, neither of
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which could be Kane County. True the chain of events
which led to this action commenced in Kane County
where the possession of the cattle was turned to the
buyer and had this buyer, Tri-State been joined as a party defendant, Kane County might conceivably have
been a county where the action could be filed. But Tristate is not joined and therefore the only cause of action is against the two buyers and as to them, Kane
County was not the proper county.
The common law rule in replevin was that if the
defendants took possession lawfully or not tortiously,
a demand was necessary as a condition precedent to
b1·inging the action and the cause of action would arise
at the place where demand was made and the refusal given. In fact the old Utah case of Woodward vs. Edmunds,
57 Pac. 848 so holds and therefore, the cause of action could not have possibly have arisen in Kane County. Also the Utah case of Nebeker vs. Harvey, 60 Pac.
10::?9 held that the County where the demand is made
a•1d refusal to return possession is the proper county
for replevin and cites the Woodward case. Also the case
of Floor vs. Mitchell 41 Pac. 2d 281 (Utah) construes
Section 78-13-7 and holds that "in all other cases, the
action must be tried in the County in which the cause
of action arises or in the county in which the defendant
resides. In such causes, the plaintiff has not the option
and if he brings the action in the wrong county, he must
yield to a change of venue when properly and timely
dcm;indecl." It would appear that section 78-13-7 is conelusive and that an action in replevin must be brought
citl~ce in the county \Vhere the defendants reside or
where the cause of action arose neither of which was
Kane County.
SUMMARY

In summary the Bill of Sale executed by the plain-
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tiff passed title to the Tri-State Livestock Auction and
it in turn passed title to the defendants who purchased
at the auction. But even if the title did not so pass, still
the purchasers at the auction obtained title for the reason that possession of the cattle was delivered to and
entrusted to a livestock dealer and it is common knowledge that a dealer buys and sells. Under the Uniform
Commercial Code the entrusting of possession to the
dealer gave the dealer power to pass title to good faith
purchasers in the ordinary course of business and this
would be so even though the plaintiff intended a "cash
sale" dependent upon the payment of the draft which
was actually dishonored. But even so, Kane County was
not the proper county in which to file and try this action and the motion for a change of venue should have
been granted.
Respectfully submitted,
ORVILLE ISOM
Attorney for Appellants

